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PREFACE
T
he size of Québec’s public debt is a source of concern for the public and the various economic
stakeholders. The State’s leeway is already sharply restricted by that incompressible budget
item: payments of the interest on the debt.
Given the magnitude of coming demographic changes, we cannot simply allow the public debt to
grow, as was done in the past.
Nor can we be content to curb its growth to keep it at its current level (in absolute terms), hoping
that the decrease in its weight with respect to the economy’s size will alleviate the financial burden
it represents. If we do not act, the decline in tax revenues that will go hand in hand with the decline
in the labour force, combined with the inevitable increase in the cost of health services as the
population ages, will make the financial obligations associated with the debt even heavier.
Already, prudence and a concern for intergenerational equity enjoin us to act. Without question, it
is the first option among the following alternatives that is to be preferred: choose that which can be
implemented today in an orderly, measured and gradual fashion, or opt for an uncertainty that will
cripple coming generations, and a probable major crisis they would have to cope with if no steps
are taken to accelerate the trimming of the public debt’s weight.
Our responsibility toward coming generations appeals to our solidarity, to collective mobilization
which must result in a firm government commitment that is focused on the long term and framed
by legislation. The continuity of this commitment must be ensured so that we can reach our goal.
Because the amounts at stake are substantial, because we have limited leeway, and because the
duty to achieve results is imperative, a structured, rigorous approach is required, one that is based
on one or more consistent revenue streams.
This study reviews this major challenge, and proposes an advantageous solution in terms of
sustainable development. This solution deserves to be taken into consideration in the framework
of the current thinking and debate on turning Québec’s fiscal situation around.
Because the next step—the most important step of all—is to take action.
Alban D’Amours
President and Chief Executive Office, Desjardins Group5 The public finance challenge of Québec
SUMMARY
F
iscally, Québec is faced with a critical situation, a situation that, unless tough choices are made,
will make it hard to deal with its already aging population, to replace and modernize many public
infrastructures, when needed, and maintain its competitive strength on the North American and
international stages.
Québec is Canada’s most indebted province. While there is more than one source of data,
Québec’s total (or gross) debt stood at $116.6B on March 31, 2005. According to the reference
documents for the Québec government’s recent pre-budgetary consultations, the debt represented
44.0% of Québec’s GDP, compared to 20.5% for the average of other Canadian provinces, and
30.3% for Ontario. If we take Québec’s share of federal government debt into consideration, the
ratio of total debt to GDP is estimated at about 80% for Québec, while the ratio for net debt is
assessed at 50%, results that are among the worst for industrialized nations. While such national
and international comparisons may be the focus of some criticism, it is still undeniable that
Québecers must carry one of the heaviest debt burdens in the industrialized world.
Three quarters of the Québec government’s debt was used to pay for the cost of running the State,
that is, current operating expenses, including salaries for civil servants. Debt financing costs now
stand at close to $7.5B a year, i.e., 13.3 cents per dollar of revenue. This is the third largest
government expenditure item, after the ministère de la Santé et des Services sociaux and the
ministère de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport. Moreover, in this analysis of the fiscal situation, we
must also consider a number of major factors specific to Québec that substantially aggravate the
issues surrounding Québec’s indebtedness. Among the most important factors are the quickly
aging population, less collective wealth, higher public expenditure and a heavier tax burden than
in neighbouring provinces, a low labour productivity rate, and the fact that the economy’s productive
capacities are lower than those of our main trade competitors.
The bulk of this debt load allowed the Québec State to finance programs beyond its capacity to pay,
relying on economic growth to eventually take over from credit. We now know that this wish did not
come true. In recent years, economic growth has helped to trim the relative size of the public debt,
but debt service continues to have a sizeable weight in public investment. Despite the efforts made
to maintain a “zero” deficit, in absolute value, Québec’s public debt has continued to increase,
concomitantly reducing the government’s flexibility. Stronger action must therefore be taken to first
stabilize the debt’s growth, then gradually repay a proportion of it. If such action is not taken, Québec
will have to resign itself to being at the back of the pack and, increasingly, suffer the adverse
consequences of this situation.
We need to turn toward bold and innovative solutions soon. There is no miracle solution. Everything
depends on the will of our leaders and the public to tackle that which can be changed by taking
charge of our problems. Unfortunately, the size of the debt and the lengthy delay in resolving these
problems have limited our options. Increasing tax and income tax, cutting public expenditure or
monetizing certain public assets are solutions that are very difficult to implement in practice, or have
a narrow impact. In contrast, charging reasonable rates for public services is a measure that can
be put into effect in the short term and is a very effective solution in terms of the economy.6 The public finance challenge of Québec
Among the collective measures we propose in this study, let us first look at gradually increasing
prices for electricity to bring them more into line with market prices. There are two advantages to
this measure from the perspective of sustainable development: it fosters better allocation of
hydropower resources (and therefore energy efficiency) and enables a direct, binding application
of the proceeds of the economic rent obtained by increasing electricity prices to cutting the debt,
in compliance with a law (the expansion of the 1996 Act respecting the elimination of the deficit and
a balanced budget to include debt control, which stipulates creation of a fund to repay the debt).
The abundance and importance of Québec’s hydropower resources prompt an increase in
electricity rates. This operation is cost effective in the short run because it brings in the amounts
required to repay the debt. Québec is the second largest per capita consumer of electricity in the
world! We are currently seeing overconsumption, even wastage, of hydropower resources.
Charging low rates for electricity (lower than those in effect outside Québec) leads to a loss of
revenue, even a shortfall, for society. This is also a regressive measure in social terms: it benefits
the wealthiest consumers who are in a position to use more electricity. Pricing utilities properly puts
the truth about costs front and centre in the effective use of resources.
In 2004, if the price of electricity in Québec had been set at the average price charged in large North
American cities, Québec demand for electricity would have declined, and an additional quantity
could have been exported at the average export price. This would have generated an economic rent
of about $5.3B. If low-income earners were to get a larger Québec sales tax (QST) refund as
compensation, this would take a little over $250M from the $5.3B. Aligning electricity prices with the
market price would generate about $5B more each year. This adjustment is, of course, not realistic
in the short term, but it gives a good indication of the magnitude of the economic rent that could be
generated by increasing electricity prices. By not charging the price that others can obtain
elsewhere, we are renouncing an additional source of revenue. We also analyze the effects of
several uniform yearly increases (2%, 5%, 10% and 20%) over a long period for all sectors.
This document also presents several recommendations for improving fiscal management and the
economy’s performance, and to equip ourselves for reverses that we are not in the least prepared
for (for instance, increasing budgetary spending at a pace that is slower than that of economic
growth, and creating a yearly contingency reserve of $500M in the short term, and $1B within five
years). The expansion of the anti-deficit act must also be accompanied by measures that could help
accelerate the correction process, or at least not hinder it. We thus need credible, prudent policies,
such as: 1) not deviating from the rule of thumb about only going into debt to invest; 2) freezing
government spending or at least its growth rate in real terms; and 3) privileging economic cost-
effectiveness for capital spending that increases the debt.
Unless we collectively take control of these problems, Québec faces a difficult future, which could
lead to an economic and demographic decline. Resolving the fiscal imbalance would not be enough
to correct Québec’s situation. Rather, we need to question ourselves as soon as possible. We might
not have another opportunity. As with all true social projects, the challenge is enormous. Ignoring
the problem or continuing to put off resolving it could not only, as the years and decades unfold,
jeopardize our social programs and the place of a modern Québec in the North American economy,
but also put a heavy burden on the next generation.7 The public finance challenge of Québec
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INTRODUCTION
Québec is entering a critical time in its post-industrial history. In addition to evolving in a constantly
changing environment, subject to increasingly fierce competition both nationally and internationally,
it is facing huge domestic challenges that demand a rapid change in course. This change in course,
for which there must be broad consensus, is essential to maintaining Québecers’ standard of living
from now until the end of this century.
One of the primary obstacles we are facing is a very precarious fiscal situation that will, unless tough
choices are made, make it difficult for Québec to deal with its already aging population, to replace
and modernize many public infrastructures, when needed, and maintain its capacity to compete on
the North American and international stages. In spite of the progress made since the economic
summit held in the fall of 1996, Québec’s GDP per capita remains 13% and 16% below the GDPs
of Canada and Ontario respectively. Moreover, the Québec government’s spending per capita
exceeds that of the Canadian and Ontario governments by 9% and 28% respectively. As a result,
Québec’s tax burden is much heavier than those of its immediate partners: it can no longer resort
to further tax increases without compromising its competitive strength.
Moreover, Québec is Canada’s most indebted province. In 2005, according to the reference
documents for the Québec government’s recent pre-budgetary consultations, Québec’s total debt
stood at $116.6B, which represented 44.0% of Québec’s GDP, compared to a 25.2% average for
the provinces (20.5% with Québec excluded), and 30.3% for Ontario. And, if Québec’s share of
federal debt (about 20% of a total $701B in debt) is taken into consideration, Québec’s total debt
ratio in comparison with its economy would be 80%. This is one of the poorest performances among
industrialized nations. Despite the efforts made to maintain a “zero” deficit, in absolute value, this
public debt has continued to increase, concomitantly reducing the government’s flexibility, while
Québec’s population is aging and the country as a whole must deal with rising public health costs.
Québec is, in fact, aging more quickly than its neighbours, and growing more slowly demographically.
The aging of the population will soon slow the long-term potential for economic growth. According
to the ministère des Finances du Québec, the labour force participation rate (proportion of the
population that is employable) will begin to drop in years to come, gradually, then more quickly as
of 2010, reducing the Québec economy’s productive capacities.
Today, no one can deny how precarious Québec’s fiscal situation is. A quick about-face is thus
required to get ready to deal with this situation. We will no doubt need to seek innovative, bold
solutions, such as we propose in sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this study.
There is no miracle solution. Everything depends on the will of our leaders and the public to tackle
that which can be changed by taking charge of our problems. Macroeconomically, we believe we
must first focus on the unavoidable issue of the debt, so as to decrease its weight and increase the
Québec State’s financial leeway in a lasting manner. This would keep us from passing a heavy
burden on to coming generations. The documents tabled at the 2004 Forum des générations left
no room for doubt on this matter. It is an issue of intergenerational equity. Also, over time, a high
debt level leads to other problems (solvency, economic efficiency and political issues) with the12 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
1 In contrast to progressivity, regressivity describes a measure whose effect decreases proportionately as
revenue increases.
economy. All Québec residents must view reducing the debt as a major priority, starting today. Our
future depends on it!
In recent years, a number of governments (including the governments of Canada and other
countries) have recognized the harmful consequences that can result from high debt levels, and
have taken steps to reduce the debt. Every year, Canada’s federal government uses one third of
the budget surplus that is in excess of the contingency reserve toward debt retirement. Ten years
ago, Alberta passed the Balanced Budget and Debt Retirement Act. In 2005, this province
succeeded in completely eliminating its outstanding debt. Even Nova Scotia created a specific debt
retirement fund in 2003 before implementing, in 2005, a new plan for retiring the debt that enables
certain amounts (collected as a result of revenues from offshore oil) to be allocated to paying off
the debt. Lastly, every year, the Manitoba governments transfer an amount specifically earmarked
for paying off its debt to its sinking fund. A number of countries abroad, such as New Zealand,
Sweden and Ireland, have also taken steps to reduce their debt levels. In the summer of 2005,
France even formed an expert committee (Pébereau commission) to ensure that its public finances
are put into order and create new flexibility, including the adoption of measures related to debt
management.
In this study, as collective measures, we recommend such things as gradually raising electricity
rates to bring them more into line with market prices. What is involved is, initially, fostering a better
allocation of hydropower resources and therefore energy efficiency and then applying, directly and
in a binding manner, the proceeds of the economic rent obtained by increasing electricity rates to
bringing down the debt, in compliance with the law (expansion of the 1996 Act respecting the
elimination of the deficit and a balanced budget to include debt control, which stipulates creation
of a fund to repay the debt). Our analyses show that the total or partial freeze on hydropower
resource prices is regressive
1 insofar as it benefits those who are well off, and leads to
overconsumption and even waste. We recommend compensating the least fortunate for the
perverse effects of an increase in electricity rates by, for example, increasing their QST refund.
We also present several recommendations for improving fiscal management and the economy’s
performance, to equip ourselves for economic reverses that we are not in the least prepared for
(these proposals include creating a yearly contingency fund and increasing budgetary spending at
a pace that is slower than that of economic growth). We also back other measures, several of which
are already known, to reduce the gap between Québec’s productivity and that of its main trading
partners.
Unless we collectively take control of all these problems, Québec faces a difficult future, which could
lead to its economic and demographic decline. We do not believe that a resolution in the area of
the fiscal imbalance will be sufficient to correct the Québec situation. Rather, we need to challenge
ourselves as soon as possible. We believe we currently have a window of opportunity for action,
one that we may never have again. It is up to Québecers to seize this opportunity.13 The public finance challenge of Québec
1. The magnitude of the challenge and related problems
____________________
2 According to several sources, these bodies’ gross debt is just
over $50B.
Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec and Desjardins, Economic Studies
Table 1
Québec government’s debt structure


















In this section, we will look at the problems associated
with Québec’s fiscal situation and indebtedness.
Specifically, we will strive to answer the following ques-
tions: what is the size of Québec’s public debt, and where
does it rank in relation to the debt of neighbouring provin-
ces and the other main industrialized nations? What are
the current and potential problems caused by this debt
level? Finally, what consequences will inaction have for
the future evolution of Québec’s public finances?
1.1. Public debt in Québec
Firstly, we must look at the size of the Québec
government’s debt, even though this problem is a well-
known one that has already gained a broad consensus.
Total public debt is, first and foremost, made up of direct
debt, that is, primarily the debt contracted by issuing
Québec government securities on national and interna-
tional financial markets (mostly made up of Treasury bills
and government bonds). However, direct debt does not
represent all of the Québec government’s financial
commitments. In fact, total debt is the sum of direct debt
and the net liabilities of the State employee pension
funds. Net debt is equal to total debt minus net financial
assets. Here are some details on this issue.
1.1.1. Gross or total debt
Before describing the make-up and evolution of gross or
total debt, we must first specify that the total debt of the
Québec government’s consolidated fund does not take
into consideration the debt of the health and education
network. Yet, in fact, the province of Québec secures this
debt. Moreover, the Québec government secures the
debt of State corporations such as Hydro-Québec and
the debt of Québec municipalities for national and inter-
national investors. Thus, even though the Québec
government is not directly responsible for repaying the
debt of these local entities, it is the final “endorser” for the
debt, which further deepens its liability for public debt2. At
this stage, it should be noted that there is not just one
source of data and one way of describing a government’s
debt level. Throughout this study, we will thus be presenting
a variety of data on the Québec indebtedness situation
that provide a very good overall picture of the size of the
public debt in Québec and allow comparisons to be
instituted.
According to the ministère des Finances du Québec, the
government’s total debt stood at $116.6B on
March  31,  2005. As graph 1 shows, this debt barely
existed at the start of the 70s. The cost of financing the
debt, as established in the April 2005 budget plan, now
totals almost $7.5B per year, that is, 13.3 cents per dollar
of revenue (in income and other taxes and transfers from
the federal government). This is the third largest
government expenditure item, after the item for the minis-
tère de la Santé et des Services sociaux (approximately
Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec and Desjardins, Economic Studies
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$21B) and the item for the ministère de l’Éducation, du
Loisir et du Sport (about $12B). The situation is, of
course, better than it was in the 1997-1998 fiscal year, at
which time debt service amounted to close to 18% of
budgetary revenues, but it is still a heavy financial burden
when compared to the ratio of about 5% seen in the start
of the 70s (see graph 2).
Total debt continues to climb by about $2B a year, even
though the government has not, on average, posted a
deficit since the return to a balanced budget in the 1998-
1999 fiscal year. The increase in the debt stems mainly
from three sources: 1) the government borrows (just over
$1B a year) to finance fixed assets, but only the annual
depreciation is recorded during the fiscal year underway;
2) the government also contracts a debt (about $1B a
year) because it records all of Hydro-Québec’s profits in
its revenues but only receives a dividend that corres-
ponds to about half of the profits every year; and 3) the
government also borrows to make investments in its
State corporations.
The Québec government’s total (or gross) debt of almost
$120B was primarily used to pay for the cost of running
the State, i.e., current operating expenses, including the
salaries of civil service employees. In fact, according to
the Ministère des Finances du Québec, three quarters of
the debt, i.e., $86.3B on March 31, 2005, stems from the
deficits posted starting in the early 70s. These repeated
deficits were, as the saying goes, used to buy the
government’s “groceries”. Moreover, the portion of the
debt used to finance net financial assets and fixed assets
is only $30.3B, i.e., 26% of Québec’s total debt. This
portion of the debt does not lead to any intergenerational
inequity since recent generations are already benefiting
from the assets acquired, as will future generations. This
is not true, however, for the portion that has been amassed
over time for current operating expenses: it represents
three quarters of the accumulated debt.
1.1.2. A description of the net debt
A measurement that is more representative of the level of
indebtedness must consider not just the government’s
liabilities, but also its net financial assets. The net debt,
i.e., total debt less net financial assets, is the benchmark
that is the most frequently used in analyzing governments’
indebtedness, in both Canada and abroad. Note that net
debt does not consider non-financial assets, such as
public property (roads, hospitals, etc.) that is, in the main,
difficult to assess financially.
In the latest Québec government accounting reform
implemented in the 1997-1998 fiscal year, the accounting
rules were changed so as to have net debt split into two
headings in public accounts and budget documents:
1) the debt represented by the deficits amassed over the
years; and 2) the deficit stemming from capital spending.
Previously, capital spending was fully recorded in
budgetary spending in the year in which the asset was
acquired or built. For example, when a bridge was built,
it was fully recorded in the budgetary spending for the
fiscal year underway. Since the reform, the government’s
capital spending is amortized over the fixed asset’s
estimated lifespan. Thus, now, only the assets’ annual
depreciation is recorded in the budgetary expenditures
for the fiscal year underway. Since the 1997-1998 fiscal
year, capital spending has only a marginal impact on
expenditure and budget balance for the fiscal year in
which it was incurred. However, financing for these assets



































Distribution of Québec government’s total debt
(at March 31, 2005)
Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec and Desjardins, Economic Studies
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Change in net debtt = (expenditurest – revenuest) +
acquisition of fixed assetst
necessarily leads to an increase in the debt, whether it
occurs through a new issue of securities, or through a
reduction in the government’s financial assets (cash flow,
exchange transaction accounts, loans, investments and
advances). As the following identity shows, changes in
net debt are composed of the budget balance and the
value of new investments in fixed assets for the current
fiscal year.
Clearly, achieving a balanced budget is no longer enough
to maintain a “zero” deficit. For example, during the 1998-
1999 to 2001-2002 fiscal years, the Québec government
had four budget surpluses, but net debt still rose by about
$4B, due primarily to an increase in capital spending.
1.1.3. Québec’s net debt
As we mentioned earlier, the Québec government has,
over the years, frequently resorted to budget deficits to
finance current operating expenses. The resulting increase
in the public debt has substantially inflated the interest
payment burden, which has helped to worsen the
province’s budget situation. At its peak in 1994-1995, the
Québec government’s annual deficit reached $5.8B,
representing approximately 16% of its total revenues at
that time. It was thus necessary to rectify the situation to
keep the Québec government’s credit rating from being
downgraded. The strong economic growth seen as the
new millennium approached, and a series of fiscal and
budgetary measures then helped to gradually reduce the
deficit. In 1996, the government passed a law limiting
budget deficits (Act respecting the elimination of the
deficit). There was even a slight surplus as of fiscal 1998-
1999. The Québec government’s budget situation remains
precarious, however, as shown by the three recent bud-
get deficits for the 2002-2003, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005
fiscal years.
According to the ministère des Finances du Québec, the
government’s net debt has gone from $2.3B in 1970-
1971 to almost $100B in 2004-2005, an average increase
of $2.7B per year. The ratio of net debt to gross domestic
product (GDP), which provides an indication of its size in
relation to the size of the economy, went from 10.1% in
1970-1971 to 36.7% in 2004-2005, reaching a peak of
47.0% in 1997-1998. The fact that the ratio has fallen in
recent years—though net debt has continued to grow—
is solely the result of faster growth on Québec’s nominal
GDP, that is, the combined effect of inflation and the
economy’s growth.
1.1.4. Comparison with the other provinces
How does this debt level compare to those of Canada’s
other provinces? We should emphasize that the data
from the public accounts published by the various provin-
ces, such as those used by the ministère des Finances du
Québec, are hard to compare because of the diverging
application of different accounting standards and the
division of responsibilities between the various tiers of
government. Any comparison must therefore be based
on the harmonized data from Statistics Canada’s Financial
Management System.
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Evolution of the Québec government’s net debt
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As shown in tables 2 and 3, Québec is one of Canada’s
most indebted provinces. It ranks third from last with
respect to the relative size of its debt in relation to the size
of its economy, for both total and net debt. When divided
by the number of inhabitants, on March 31, 2004, Québec’s
net debt stood at $12,937 per Québecer, while total debt
stood at $22,265.
Ontario (despite its recent deficits) and, in particular,
Alberta are well ahead of Québec. The province of
Alberta has benefited substantially from high prices for its
natural resources, i.e., oil and natural gas, in recent
years, which has allowed it to eliminate its debt. It even
currently has net assets (equal to close to 10% of its GDP)
and the Heritage Savings Trust Fund, an accumulated
fund valued at approximately $13B. Even if Québec is still
ahead of it, Newfoundland and Labrador should, in the
future, benefit from oil revenues to improve its budget
situation.
1.1.5. International comparison
Internationally, the lack of harmonized data makes it even
more difficult to compare the Québec government’s debt
situation to that of other industrialized countries. If we add
Québec’s share of federal debt, Québec’s total debt
represents approximately 80% of its GDP, while the ratio
of net debt to GDP is close to 50%. Note that total debt
corresponds to net debt plus the government’s net financial
assets. In terms of indebtedness, even if net debt is a
more representative measurement of a government’s
debt level, total debt provides a better indication of the






1   Alberta 12.4 6,611
2   Ontario 33.1 13,173
3   Saskatchewan 51.2 18,829
4   Prince Edward Island 54.1 15,123
5   Nova Scotia 62.0 19,112
6   British Columbia 65.5 22,675
7   Manitoba 65.7 21,349
8   Québec 66.3 22,265
9   Newfoundland and Labrador 67.7 23,905
10   New Brunswick 74.5 22,237
  Average for 10 provinces 55.2 18,528
  Average excluding Québec 54.0 18,113
Source: Statistics Canada’s Financial Management System
Table 2
Comparison of total debt in Canada
At March 31, 2004
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Statistics Canada, ministère des Finances









































In % of GDP
Graph 6
International comparison of the ratio of total debt to GDP in 2004
Note: Québec’s debt is calculated based on the debt of the government of Québec, to which Québec’s share of federal government
debt is added. Québec’s portion of federal debt is estimated to be between 16% and 24%, with a target of 20%. Note that net pension
fund liability was excluded in both cases for the purposes of the comparison with OECD data.
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Statistics Canada, ministère des Finances

































In % of GDP
Graph 7
International comparison of the ratio of net debt to GDP in 2004
Note: Québec’s debt is calculated based on the debt of the government of Québec, to which Québec’s share of federal government
debt is added. Québec’s portion of federal debt is estimated to be between 16% and 24%, with a target of 20%. Note that net pension
fund liability was excluded in both cases for the purposes of the comparison with OECD data.






1   Alberta -8,4 -4 476
2   British Columbia 14,6 5 058
3   Ontario 22,0 8 761
4   New Brunswick 26,3 7 858
5   Saskatchewan 27,7 10 195
6   Manitoba 29,1 9 442
7   Prince Edward Island 33,5 9 335
8   Québec 38,5 12 937
9   Nova Scotia 40,6 12 505
10   Newfoundland and Labrador 54,4 19 222
  Average for 10 provinces 27,8 9 086
  Average excluding Québec 26,6 8 658
Source: Statistics Canada’s Financial Management System
Table 3
Comparison of net debt in Canada
At March 31, 200417 The public finance challenge of Québec
burden this places on taxpayers as a result of the related
interest payments.
Our results also correspond with the results from a study
by the Fraser Institute released in June 2004, which put
the Québec government among the most indebted
governments of high-income nations and Canadian pro-
vinces. When net debt is compiled with discretionary
income3, Québec ranks 26th out of a total of 314.
In summary, while these national and international
comparisons could be subject to criticism, it is clear that
Québec’s government is one of the most indebted.
Québecers must therefore cope with one of the heaviest
debt loads in the industrialized world.
1.2. Factors aggravating Québec’s public
indebtedness
We have just seen that Québec is a particularly indebted
province, especially when compared to other Canadian
provinces and some countries that are comparable
economically (although such comparisons must be made
with care). Moreover, to analyze Québec’s fiscal situa-
tion, we must take into account a number of important
factors that are making the problem of Québec’s
indebtedness worse in relation to its partners and
competitors. Here are a few of the factors:
1.2.1. Faster aging of the population
Québec will have a demographic problem in the next few
decades: it’s an open secret. According to the Institut de
la statistique du Québec (ISQ-2004) and the ministère
des Finances du Québec (February 2005), the rate at
which the population is growing will slow substantially in
the next fifty years. This downturn implies that, by around
the year 2050, Québec’s population will only be slightly
larger than it is today. Québec’s population will reach a
peak in around the year 2030 (8.1 million inhabitants),
then enter a period of gradual decline.
____________________
3 A discretionary income is the minimum amount required to buy
subsistence goods and services.
4 Note that the Scandinavian countries have a very enviable
position. In fact, because of their many assets and the way
these are recorded, these countries have a very low, even
negative net debt (assets are larger than total debt).
Sources: Statistics Canada, Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) and Desjardins, Economic Studies























Number of people Number of people
Peak of 8,100,000 in 2031
Ranking Country
Net debt/discretionay 
income ($US) in %
   1 Norway -73,4
   2 Finland -42,7
   3 Sweden -3,1
   4 Australia 5,7
   5 Denmark 8,4
   6 Yukon 11,1
   7 New Zealand 20,6
   8 Alberta 20,8
   9 Northwest Territories 24,5
   10 Iceland 26,3
   11 Barbados 26,3
   12 United Kingdom 29,1
   13 British Columbia 36,6
   14 France 38,3
   15 Saskatchewan 40,7
   16 Netherlands 42,0
   17 United States 42,5
   18 Spain 42,6
   19 Canada 44,3
   20 Ontario 44,6
   21 Germany 45,0
   22 Manitoba 45,4
   23 New Brunswick 45,9
   24 Prince Edward Island 48,8
   25 Austria 50,6
   26 Québec 55,2
   27 Nova Scotia 56,5
   28 Japan 64,4
   29 Newfoundland and Labrador 67,3
   30 Italy 99,1
   31 Belgium 99,7
Table 4
Ratio of net debt to discretionary income
(provinces of Canada and high-income countries)
Source: Fraser Institute (2004)18 The public finance challenge of Québec
Other industrialized nations will be experiencing this
phenomenon, as well. That said, Québec’s population
decline will be so sharp that it will be more like that of
Japan and some countries in Europe, such as Italy, where
the population is deemed to be at a critical level. Moreover,
even if Québec’s primary trading partners, i.e., the rest of
Canada and the United States, will also be experiencing
demographic problems, their population should at least
not decrease.
As a reference, the ISQ provides a scenario in which the
proportion of the population that is aged 65 and over goes
from just over 10% at the start of the year 2000 to about
25% in the year 2030, then 30% towards mid-century.
There are a number of reasons for the increase in the
number of people aged 65 and over: 1) increased life
expectancy; 2) the aging of the “baby-boomer” cohort;
3) a low birth rate; and 4) unfavourable traditional migratory
flows.
Québec’s population began to age later than the popula-
tions of other industrialized nations due to the high birth
rates recorded in the last one hundred years. However,
since the renewal rate for Québec’s population has
dropped sharply in the last three decades and net migra-
tion, while positive, should not be very high, demographic
aging will occur more quickly in Québec than for its main
trade partners. This situation implies that the number of
workers will gradually decrease. We will therefore have
fewer and fewer workers per retiree, which will inevitably
further exacerbate the fiscal pressure on tax payers to
finance public services (including debt service). Don’t
forget that it is the workers who participate the most in
economic activity and make the largest contribution to
financing public services. Finally, this bad demographic
news could undermine potential gains from a resolution
of the issue on sharing the fiscal imbalance between the
various tiers of government.
1.2.2. Less collective wealth
The soundness of a government’s public finances usually
goes hand in hand with how much wealth that State has.
Although it is rich in comparison with the average country,
Québec is nonetheless poorer, from a financial perspec-
tive, than the immediate neighbours with whom it has
business ties. In fact, in spite of the advances made in the
last few years, Québec’s GDP per capita is 13% and 16%
below the average for Canada’s provinces and Ontario
respectively. It is also 32% below that of the United
States. Lower wealth requires a greater effort from taxable
Sources: Statistics Canada, Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) and Desjardins, Economic Studies






































































































































In 2006 In 2026 In 2051
Graph 10
Québec’s projected population by age group
Number of people Number of people
Sources: Institut de la statistique du Québec (ISQ) and Desjardins, Economic Studies
Expected change in Québec’s population of labour force age

























Number of people Number of people
Peak of 4,900,000 in 201319 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
5 Labour productivity indicates the number of units produced per
hour worked.
Québecers to maintain an equivalent level of public
services. High public debt only intensifies this effort.
1.2.3. Higher public spending
In addition to having less collective wealth, Québec has
more public spending per capita than the Canadian
provincial average. These expenditures exceed the
Canadian average by about $800, and are about $2,000
higher than Ontario’s. In percentage terms, the Québec
government’s expenditure per capita exceeds that of the
Canadian and Ontario governments by 9% and 28%
respectively. Higher debt service in Québec and, in
particular, the larger array of public services available to
citizens are largely responsible for this gap. We will return
to this issue in point 1.4.
1.2.4. Low productivity at work
Data on productivity5 show that Québec is lagging well
behind Ontario, the average for Canadian provinces and
the United States. While the productivity rate for Québec
labour has gone up recently, it is still below that of its main
trading partners. Québec’s labour productivity has, in
fact, advanced quickly: it has gone from 0.8% between
1981 and 1998 to 1.5% in the last five years. However,
this acceleration has not kept the productivity gap between
Québec and its primary partners from growing recently.
This increase is due, on one hand, to lesser investment
by Québec business and, on the other hand, by Québec
workers’ lower average education level. According to the
ministère des Finances du Québec (January, 2006),
growth in productivity by Québec’s economy should
decelerate soon, and might only post an annual average
of 1.3% in the next half-century. Low productivity keeps
Québec from benefiting from faster economic growth,
which deprives the public finances of additional budgetary
revenue.
1.2.5. A weakening potential GDP
The aging population and, to a lesser degree, the drop in
the worker productivity rate will have a notable impact on
the long-term growth of Québec’s GDP. In absolute
terms, Québec’s long-term potential GDP will continue to
decline over the decades to come. It should drop from the
current 2.1% to about 1% by the 2040s, a major decline





















Canadian average Québec Ontario United States
Real GDP per capita and geographic area in 2004
Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec, Statistics Canada, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)





















Canadian average Québec Ontario
Total budget expenditure per capita and area in 2004-2005






























Canadian average Ontario United States
Québec’s productivity gap with Ontario, Canada and the United States: 
comparison between 1990 and 2004
Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec, Prebudget Consultations Paper, reference document, January 2006,
and Desjardins, Economic Studies
Graph 1420 The public finance challenge of Québec
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6 Ontario also has an equivalent proportion of taxpayers who
pay no tax, but has more high-income taxpayers.
Québec’s standard of living is likely to be curbed by the
drop in the economy’s productive capacities. Annual
growth in real GDP per capita could stand at only 1% as
early as the end of the next decade, performance which
is of real concern given how rich North America is.
1.2.6. A heavy fiscal burden
Québec’s taxpayer must, on average, carry the heaviest
fiscal burden in the provinces, after Newfoundland and
Labrador. The gap for individuals as a whole is over $1B
per year between Québec and the Canadian average,
and close to $3.5B between Québec and Ontario.
Québec’s heavier tax burden limits the Québec
government’s ability to levy new taxes to reduce the
public debt, and also discourages some workers from
participating actively in the labour market. Note that this
burden is very heavy for those who must finance public
services: 14% of taxpayers pay 60% of the income tax
whereas close to 45% of taxable Québecers do not pay
tax6.
For Québec business, the total tax bill is also one of the
highest in Canada. In fact, “flat” taxes (i.e., not dependent
on the level of profit), such as capital and payroll taxes,
diminish the competitive strength of Québec businesses,
attracting less investment and generating inferior perfor-
mance. Less investment also means fewer jobs, and thus
less tax revenue.
Graph 15


















Demography’s contribution Productivity’s contribution
Long-run growth potential of real GDP
Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec, Impacts des changements démographiques sur l’économie, le marché du travail 
et les finances publiques, reference document, February 2005, and Desjardins, Economic Studies
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Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec, Impacts des changements démographiques sur l’économie, le marché du travail 
et les finances publiques, reference document, February 2005, and Desjardins, Economic Studies






In millions of dollars 2003 2005 2006
Difference Québec – other provinces
Alberta 4,433 4,081 3,756
Ontario 5,627 3,758 3,420
British Columbia 3,538 3,046 3,057
Saskatchewan 2,234 1,799 1,461
New Brunswick 1,526 798 573
Manitoba 937 577 414
Nova Scotia 689 435 86
Prince Edward Island 1,099 390 41
Newfoundland and Labrador -677 -1,316 -1,663
Average difference 2,156 1,508 1,238
Table 5
Gap between Québec and other provinces for personal
income tax, applying the other provinces’ tax structure
to Québec
Sources: ministère des Finances du Québec, Prebudget Consultations, Reminder, 
January 2006, and Desjardins, Economic Studies
Corporate tax
as a % of GDP (2002) Capital
1 Labour
2 Total
United States 1,8 3,4 5,2
Canada excluding Québec 3,6 3,2 6,8
Québec 4,1 4,9 9,0
1 Tax on profits and tax on capital.
2 Employer costs and other payroll taxes.
Table 6
Corporate tax burden
Source: Luc Godbout, Université de Sherbrooke, in Pierre Fortin’s study, 200521 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
7 According to the study by Pierre Fortin (2005), professor,
Université du Québec à Montréal.
1.2.7. High dependence on federal transfers
In recent years, federal transfers to Québec have grown
much faster than the Québec government’s own-source
revenu has. While transfers are desirable, they still put
the provincial government in a very dependent situation.
A change in Ottawa’s redistribution policy or an economic
downturn could reduce transfers. Such a situation would
put Québec’s public finances in a highly uncertain posi-
tion, a situation which would be even more precarious
than it is now. To this dependence must be added
uncertainty about the review of Canada’s equalization
formula. The expert committee formed by the federal
government has not yet released its recommendations
regarding the new formula. If Québec were to receive less
in transfer from equalization payments than it has in the
past, Québec’s public finances would incur a substantial
loss.
1.2.8. Economic fluctuations
Since the new millennium began, the interest rates on the
financial markets have been substantially lower than in
the 90s. However, given the recovery by the world’s
economy, particularly in the United States, interest rates
have, on average, gone up over the last two years. An
interest rate normalization process is underway. If interest
rates are higher in the years to come, the cost of financing
Québec’s public debt would increase. In fact, the magni-
tude of Québec’s debt makes the province’s budget
situation vulnerable to any increase in the cost of money.
Note that, each year, the Québec government must
renew between $10B and $12B of his debt, and every
upward variation in interest rates of 1% (for example,
from 3% to 4%) increases the yearly cost of borrowing by
an additional $300M to $400M in the short term, and by
$1.2B in the long term7.
Moreover, Québec and Canada have not undergone a
recession since the one in 1990-1991. This is one of the
longest periods of uninterrupted economic growth since
the end of World War II. Without wishing for a downturn
by Québec’s economy, the probability that Québec will
experience economic reverses in the next few years is
fairly high. A slowdown or cyclical decline by Québec’s
GDP would have the effect of substantially decreasing
the government’s revenues, which would make a balanced
budget almost impossible, and therefore put additional
fiscal pressure on taxpayers. According to the ministère
des Finances du Québec, every annual 1% decline in
Québec’s GDP has the effect of cutting the province’s tax
revenues by $500M.
1.2.9. Heightened international competition
Québec’s economy is a small, open economy that is
vulnerable to increased competition from abroad. This
has been particularly true in recent years for Québec’s
manufacturing sector. Increasingly strong competition
from emerging nations, especially China, India and
Mexico, is causing many problems for manufacturing
businesses. This type of environment, which will grow
increasingly competitive, will force the manufacturing
sector to adapt further. But can it? The rise of the Canadian
dollar, increasing protectionism in the United States, and
the end to import quotas in the textile and clothing
industries could gradually cause this sector to lose its
importance to the economy. Further losses of
manufacturing jobs could still occur, which would represent
a negative contribution to the economy and public finan-
ces, in both the short and medium terms. More globally,
Québec’s economy will have to deal with this structural
adjustment for several years.
1.2.10. Predictable revision of the government’s
financial results
Last fall, the auditor general corrected the Québec
government’s financial results. Among other things, he
indicated that the situation of public finances was more
precarious than the situation presented by the government.
Québec’s budgetary situation and debt level would worsen
if the Québec government were to revise its results in
accordance with the generally accepted accounting
principles used in the other provinces of Canada. Faced
with this new data, the credit rating agencies and financial
markets could penalize the Québec government by
lowering the credit rating on Québec securities. Investors
would then demand an additional premium for holding
Québec government securities. This situation would lead
to an increase in the government’s cost of borrowing and,
probably, make the financial markets less accessible.
We will discuss this point further in section 1.3.1.
1.3. The problems associated with public debt
As we have just seen, the Québec government is highly
indebted, and a number of factors aggravate this situa-22 The public finance challenge of Québec
tion. Do we really need to worry? As we will see in this
section, this high debt load could, over time, cause many
problems for the economy. These problems can be
grouped into five categories:
• Public finance problems
• Macroeconomic problems
• Economic efficiency problems
• Intergenerational equity problems
• Political problems
1.3.1. Public finance problems
For States, as for companies and individuals, one of the
biggest risks associated with excessive debt is seeing its
credit rating go down, which could lead to a default on
payment. Given its taxing power and the economic growth
witnessed over the last few decades, it is still difficult to
imagine Québec defaulting on payment. Although a
number of countries have had to deal with this situation in
the past, most of them were non-industrialized nations.
Because of their credit rating systems, the various
agencies can, in this area, provide very useful information
on the likelihood that a company or government will
default on payment. As a government’s credit rating goes
up, it is deemed less and less likely to default on payment.
For example, Moody’s, the U.S. agency, assigns the
rating of “A1” to the Québec government. Even though
this rating indicates that the Québec government’s debt
provides fairly satisfactory protection, it is still more
exposed to the adverse impacts of the economic situation
than the debt of governments with a higher rating. Thus,
Alberta’s rating, which is “Aaa” (the highest rating awarded
by Moody’s, the same rating as the Canadian
government’s), gives it an almost unshakeable financial
soundness.
According to a fundamental financial principle, as an
investment’s risk level increases, so does the rate of
return demanded by investors. The rate of return must, in
fact, reflect the allied risk. In other words, as a government’s
debt load increases, its credit quality decays and its
interest charges go up. As shown in graph 17, Alberta,
with its excellent credit rating, benefits from the lowest
interest rates. Conversely, Newfoundland and Labrador,
which has a credit rating of only “A3”, pays the highest
interest rates. Québec, like the other provinces, falls
between these two extremes, but its interest rates are still
among the highest after Newfoundland and Labrador.
Clearly, these higher interest rates represent an additional
cost for the provinces involved. For example, the average
rate on Québec bonds with maturities of ten years has
been 6.18% since 1995 compared to 5.85% for Alberta.
This 33 basis point difference may seem small, but when
it is applied to Québec’s total debt it still represents a
sizeable additional long-term burden: several hundreds
of millions of dollars a year. Thankfully, a number of
factors, such as the dip in inflation expectations (in
response to monetary policy that focuses on an inflation
target of 2%) and investment managers’ desire for yield
have contributed to a downward trend for interest rates
since the start of the 90s. This phenomenon has even
intensified recently. These two factors have substantially
reduced the interest rate spreads between the various
provinces’ securities, as well as the spreads between
provincial and federal government rates. Thus, the spread
between the rate for ten-year bonds issued by the provin-
Credit ratings assigned by Moody’s (February 2006) to Canada’s 



































Sources: Moody’s, Bloomberg and Desjardins, Economic Studies
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since January 2005 (in %)
Average rate on ten-year bonds 
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Note: Québec’s average rate
is higher than or equal to that
of lower-ranking provinces.
Federal government:
Ten-year federal government bonds have an 
Aaa rating and an average rate of 4.05%.23 The public finance challenge of Québec
ces of Québec and Alberta was only 17 basis points at the
start of 2006, compared to 34 basis points five years
earlier. The decline in interest rates has therefore reduced
the financial impact of a higher credit rating. However,
this phenomenon could reverse in the event of a relative
deterioration in Québec’s budget situation, or a marked
increase in interest rates.
The relative magnitude of Québec’s debt could also
become a major obstacle in the event of a lengthy
economic slowdown. The size of debt service limits the
government’s flexibility since, as we saw earlier, it eats up
a large share of budgetary revenue. Yet, budgetary
revenue could decline sharply in the event of prolonged
economic troubles, which would make the debt service
burden heavier. This problem is of particular concern as
program spending should increase substantially over the
coming decades due, on the one hand, to faster aging by
Québec’s population and, on the other hand, the need to
replace and modernize many public infrastructures.
1.3.2. Macroeconomic problems
In a small open economy like Québec’s, public deficits
and debt service take a major share of total savings,
leading to increasingly frequent recourse to foreign savings
or direct foreign investment. This situation would have the
effect of reducing the trade surplus or, even more serious,
increasing the trade deficit. It is difficult, however, to find
out the net result of this macroeconomic repercussion.
Consequently, it would be more relevant to focus analysis
on the macroeconomic efficiency problems associated
with public finance problems (resulting from public deficits),
that is, higher taxes and lower productive spending.
1.3.3. Economic efficiency problems
High debt service makes the fiscal burden heavier, leading
to distortions in how the economy operates, particularly in
the area of the labour market. High taxes can thus reduce
the yield the government gets from the tax base as a
result of tax evasion or avoidance. For example, the
extent of tax evasion in Québec corresponds to 5% of
GDP, while, according to the ministère des Finances du
Québec (April 2005), the government loses an estimated
$3.1B in revenue as a result of this phenomenon.
High debt also fuels uncertainty about future fiscal
circumstances and the sustainability of some public ser-
vices. This uncertainty can have an adverse affect on an
economy’s ability to attract and retain labour and capital.
1.3.4. Intergenerational equity problems
Public debt can also be a factor in equity when it is used
as a means of financing public investments that generate
long-term assets, such as the construction of a bridge.
However, public debt can be a factor of inequity when it
is used to shift the burden of operating expenses to future
generations. Later generations thus have to pay for
services that benefited preceding generations. The
inequity increases along with the wealth gap between the
generations.
The principle of intergenerational equity stipulates that
we should not leave this kind of legacy to the coming
generations. Will they be able to handle the burden of
repaying the debt contracted by their elders? Given how
mobile many workers are (qualified young workers in
particular), the weight of the fiscal burden, somewhat
inadequate wage conditions and some continuing labour
market rigidities could encourage some of these workers
to leave Québec.
1.3.5. Political problems
The public debt and the many problems it can lead to are
likely to influence the political landscape. For example,
an increasingly serious problem is emerging in public
debate in Québec: the gap between the tax that individuals
pay and the services they get in exchange. In a balanced
budget situation, the sums allocated to debt service
create a gap between the taxes paid and public services
provided. Taxpayers then feel like they’re “not getting
their money’s worth”. Tax revenues could thus decrease,
along with the support provided to government programs.
To illustrate this issue, it is useful to look at the evolution
of the ratio of program spending to budgetary revenue. In
a way, this ratio represents the yield, in terms of public
spending, of a dollar paid to the government. At the start
of the 70s, this ratio oscillated around one, with almost all
of every dollar collected by the government going to
finance program spending. The ratio subsequently
reached a peak of 1.15 toward the end of the 80s, at a time
when the government substantially increased its
indebtedness to finance current operating expenses.
Today, it is below 1 since the government has a balanced
budget and must put part of its revenues toward paying
interest on its debt.24 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
8 If all else is equal.
1.4. The consequences of not taking action
As we mentioned earlier, budgetary balance has not
been enough to stabilize the Québec government’s
indebtedness in recent years. The Québec government
has, in large part, resorted to indebtedness to finance
long-term assets, even if a “zero” deficit was attained
several times. More rigorous action is therefore required
to first stabilize the growth of Québec’s debt, then gradually
repay a portion of it. It is true that simply stabilizing or
freezing the debt at its current level would, over time, all
else being equal8, reduce the debt to GDP ratio, as has
been seen in recent years. But is this sufficient? Is it
prudent for the government to bank on ongoing, relatively
high growth rates that few or no analysts are anticipating
in the coming decades?
1.4.1. More radical measures are required
To answer this question, we need to advance a few
hypotheses. First, let us assume that the debt’s absolute
value will remain at its current level for the years to come.
Second, let us also assume that Québec’s economy will
continue, on average, to grow at a rate that is similar to its
long-term growth potential during the same period. In
general, the current growth potential for Québec’s nomi-
nal GDP is estimated at about 4.1% per year: 2.1% from
the advance by growth potential expressed in real terms,
1.3% from productivity gains, 0.8% from population growth,
and 2% from the Bank of Canada’s mean inflation target.
The advance by long-term production potential is,
however, expected to slow gradually in the decades to
come as a result of slower growth by Québec’s population
and, to a lesser extent, by the Québec workforce’s
productivity rate. Thus, the growth potential for Québec’s
nominal GDP could only be 3.0% in about 35 years.
Starting with standardized data from Statistics Canada’s
Financial Management System, a simple projection shows
us that, at this pace, it will take several years just to catch
up with the current average for the other provinces. Yet,
everything suggests that the other provinces will continue
to diminish their total debt to GDP ratio in the years and
decades to come. Note that the average total debt to GDP
ratio for all provinces, excluding Québec, is estimated at
54.0% for fiscal 2003-2004, whereas it was just over
68.1% nine years ago. For example, if the goal is to reach
Ontario’s current ratio, 33.1%, it would take about fifteen
years to get there. That said, there is nothing to guarantee
this, since the population is aging substantially faster in
Québec than in the other provinces. Moreover, many
factors are likely to aggravate the situation, which would
lead to a spiralling increase in health services costs, and
a decrease in the government’s flexibility.
This simple example clearly shows that Québecers cannot
expect to just sit on their hands and see an improvement
in the government’s debt situation. If they do not respond,
Québec will have to resign itself to being at the back of the
pack and, for several decades, suffer the adverse
consequences of an increasingly heavy fiscal burden.
Québec’s position on the national and international sta-
ges could thus deteriorate substantially. Concretely, the
health and education networks would be even more
underfunded, and public infrastructures would deteriorate
further. In other words, the door would be open to economic
underdevelopment in North America.
1.4.2. A situation that has to improve
It does not appear that the situation of Québec’s public
finances will improve substantially by itself. Necessary,
even radical measures are required to gradually repay
Québec’s debt; failing that, Québec’s standard of living
and quality of life could suffer (marked increasing in
hospital waiting times, deterioration of the population’s
health, increase in premature death, increasingly obsolete
infrastructures, etc.).
Québec will therefore have to make major adjustments in
the years to come if it does not want to lose its place on
the North American and world stages and, in particular, if
it wants to prevent a substantial drop in its population’s






















Ratio of program spending to the Québec government’s budgetary 
revenues
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standard of living. Increasing productivity and improving
the fiscal situation (through more effective taxation) could
be among the steps to take.
If Québec’s debt service—currently at 14.3% of budgetary
revenues according to harmonized data from Statistics
Canada’s Financial Management System—were to be
magically aligned with the national average, i.e., 10.7%,
this would release an additional $6.9B per year, which
could be used to lower the tax burden and finance public
services.
Don’t forget, as we have seen, the high level of debt
service could cause substantial upheaval in Québec’s
budgetary expenditure as a result of interest rate fluctua-
tions. The lower interest rates seen in recent years
facilitated the financing of the government’s debt, but
interest rates will go up at some point.
1.4.3. The relative size of the Québec state:
too much “demand” for public services?
Remedying the situation of Québec’s public finances
should be accompanied by a review of the State’s role in
our society. As table 8 shows, the proportion of GDP
represented by the Québec government’s total revenues
is among the highest in the country, and well above the
national average. Moreover, the proportion of GDP
represented by the Québec government’s total
expenditure is also one of the highest. According to the
detail on program spending, it is primarily the social
services share that really sets Québec apart from the
other provinces in Canada. Québec’s spending on this
item total 6.6% of GDP for fiscal 2004-2005, whereas the




Health Social services Education
1   Newfoundland and Labrador 25,6 26,5 8,3 3,1 6,7
2   Prince Edward Island 30,8 32,6 10,0 3,0 7,5
3   Nova Scotia 26,7 26,9 9,2 3,0 6,8
4   New Brunswick 28,6 28,4 9,4 3,1 6,2
5   Québec 26,5 27,6 7,7 6,6 5,8
6   Ontario 17,4 18,3 6,9 2,7 4,2
7   Manitoba 26,1 25,4 8,3 3,8 5,2
8   Saskatchewan 24,4 22,8 7,6 2,8 4,6
9   Alberta 17,4 15,5 5,4 2,2 4,4
10   British Columbia 22,2 21,4 7,8 2,9 5,5
  Average 24,6 24,5 8,1 3,3 5,7
  Average excluding Québec 24,4 24,2 8,1 2,9 5,7
Sources: Statistics Canada’s Financial Management System and Desjardins, Economic Studies
Table 8
Budgetary revenues and expenditures in the provinces of Canada at March 31, 2005
In % of GDP
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2. Potential solutions for rectifying Québec’s fiscal situation
We have documented the magnitude of the public debt in
Québec, along with its consequences and the related
problems. The bulk of this debt load has allowed the
Québec State to finance programs beyond its capacity to
pay by banking on the fact that economic growth would
eventually take the place of credit. We now know that this
wish has not come true. In recent years, economic growth
has helped to trim the relative size of the public debt, but
the weight of debt service remains a substantial curb on
public investment. Many of these investments now seem
necessary, particularly in the area of municipal and
highway infrastructures, as well as the health and
education networks. Unfortunately, since medium- and
long-term growth is expected to be weaker, prudence is
required in terms of responsible management and the
recovery of public finances.
Does the Québec government have enough flexibility to
correct the situation? Unfortunately, given the scope of
the problem and the time wasted in responding, it has
fewer and fewer options available to it.
2.1. What are the potential solutions?
It is possible to identify two complementary types of
solutions: short-term solutions and long-term solutions.
In the short term, there are at least four options:
• Increase taxes to repay the debt
• Reduce program spending to focus on
repaying the debt
• Monetize certain government assets and
allocate the amounts collected to repaying
the debt
• Charge for public services rather than taxing
In the medium and long term, the main thing is to rely on
economic growth to “automatically” reduce public debt.
That said, the weight of debt service is a substantial
hindrance to public investment. Moreover, as we indicated
above, a number of sectors require new public investments
now. Clearly, the relative situation of Québec’s public
finances will not improve substantially by itself, particularly
since major adjustments are needed.
In other words, tackling the public debt in the short term
could eventually activate economic growth, which would,
in turn, encourage debt reduction.
2.2. Increasing taxes
Given the context, the success of any Québec public debt
retirement policy depends on short-term intervention.
Here, increasing taxes is, without question, a solution to
be avoided. The tax burden, which fewer and fewer
taxable Québecers can bear, is already very heavy. It
would likely be counterproductive to tax Québecers any
further. The risk would be to encourage them to decrease
their contribution by reducing their effort at work, or
committing tax fraud, which is much more tempting than
in the past. Moreover, it would be very difficult to gain
political acceptance for an increase in taxes when there
is no tangible expenditure associated with it.
It would be a pipe dream to tax capital or corporations in
the current context of globalization. States play the tax
competition card to attract business and investment to
their territory.
2.3. Lowering public expenditure
A decrease in spending is certainly a valid option
economically, but it is very difficult to defend politically.
There is always a general outcry when the government
thinks about, for example, questioning daycare costs,
tuition, the cost of medication and corporate subsidies.
Since some expenditures appear to be less productive
than others, there is no doubt about reducing or eliminating
them. That said, politically, this kind of measure is often
justified by the need to raise other types of spending, such
as spending on health care. The idea of reducing some
spending so as to reduce the debt is not very attractive:
the benefits emerge over time whereas the costs are
immediate, and governments have a very short electoral
horizon.
2.4. Monetizing public assets
The option to monetize some of our assets is interesting,
but once again, prudence is required. On one hand,
monetization draws on new sources of financing and
does not increase the individual and corporate tax burden.28 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
9 See Jean-Pierre AUBRY, Progrès dans la comptabilité de nos
gouvernements: les principaux messages, ASDEQ, Document
CPP 2004-03, 2004.
It would also help free up major sums and make a
substantial payment on the public debt. That said, State
corporations and other public infrastructures represent
government assets. Their existence improves the
government’s financial position and, whether explicitly or
not, help reduce its risks, all else being equal, so as to
benefit from better long-term credit conditions. Each
asset can only be monetized once. This temporal
uniqueness is often a clear inconvenience for financing
the government’s current operations, since earnings from
these State corporations will no longer go into budgetary
revenues.
We must therefore be sure the government can release
its assets without putting essential program spending at
risk. This option deserves to be retained as an effective
policy for repaying the debt. We must also be assured
that the government will not liquidate some of its assets
to finance current operations and claim a “zero” deficit for
the year underway. This would be a completely
counterproductive policy. Unfortunately, given the
government’s current accounting parameter, this would
be completely plausible, since total public debt and even
net debt (according to the definition set out in sec-
tion 1.1.2) can increase in spite of a zero deficit9!
2.5. Charge for public services rather than
taxing
What can we say about charging for public services
instead of taxing? Several economists believe this is the
optimal choice. Pricing services correctly would allow
resources to be used efficiently. In effect, pricing that
underestimates a resource’s real value often leads to
excess consumption. There are many examples. For
example, the water and power sectors, tuition fees, and
health care. Fair pricing is an effective solution for
allocating resources and getting waste to a minimum.
Asking the consumer to pay a fair price for the public
service he receives is also entirely justified.
Fair pricing thus appears to be a step to be preferred. We
must stop using the price system as a means of
redistributing resources. Overly low fees for public servi-
ces are often socially regressive: they benefit the wealthiest
more.29 The public finance challenge of Québec
3. A measure to be privileged: raise electricity prices
____________________
10 Ministère des Ressources naturelles et de la Faune, L’Éner-
gie au Québec, édition 2003.
We have seen that there are few options available for
repaying the debt. Québec has little leeway in this matter.
So why should we raise electricity prices?
First, electricity is an important resource in Québec.
Relatively speaking, electricity is to Québec what oil is to
Alberta. Second, increasing electricity rates is a cost-
effective operation in the very short term which would
help collect the sums required to repay the debt. We have
seen that it is important to take action on this issue soon.
Third, Québec is the second largest consumer of electricity
per person in the world! Economists are not surprised by
this, given the low electricity rates in effect in Québec.
That said, it is highly likely that some of the electricity that
Québec households use is not essential to their well-
being. We are seeing overconsumption, even wastage,
of hydropower resources. Four, and we must stress this
point, charging low rates for electricity (lower than those
in effect outside Québec) leads to a loss of revenue, even
earnings foregone, for society. This is also a regressive
measure in social terms: it benefits wealthier consumers
who are in a position to use more electricity!
3.1. Abundance and overconsumption
of electricity
Graph 19 shows how abundant hydropower is in Québec,
and indicates the installed hydropower capacity of each
of the four main territories in Canada. Québec produces
almost 50% of the total installed power in Canada derived
from hydropower energy. As we mentioned, this is a
precious resource for Québecers. It would thus be fairer
to pay its real price for it (as Albertans do with oil) to keep
this gold mine from being wasted and to get the most out
of it.
Québec residents are among the biggest consumers of
electricity in the world. In 2002, Québec was the second
largest consumer of electricity per person, after Norway.
Thus, there is a difference of just over 3,000 kilowatt
hours (kWh) between Québec’s per capita consumption
and Norway’s. Moreover, in 2002, Québec’s residential
sector price for electricity was higher than Norway’s. In
the industrial sector, the two prices were identical10 when
expressed in Canadian dollars.
Graph 20 clearly demonstrates the effect of very low
prices on consumption. A lower price means higher per
capita consumption. Québecers, like Norwegians (for
whom electricity prices have gone up sharply since 2002,
moreover), consume a lot of—even too much—
hydropower resources, primarily because of their low
price. A rate closer to the market price would encourage
people to decrease their consumption.
Graph 19
Distribution of installed hydropower capacity in Canada (2002)
Source: ministère des Ressources naturelles et de la Faune, L’Énergie au Québec, édition 2004










Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Hydro-Québec, Statistics Canada, 




















Residential price (left) Consumption (right)
Average prices and yearly consumption per capita in Québec
and some industrialized countries (2002)
* Per capita consumption includes total consumption for all sectors.  It is more difficult to compare consumption with the 
average price for all sectors as the latter is not available. Canadian consumption includes Québec and Ontario.
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11 See HYDRO-QUÉBEC, “A set sum of money to be paid per
contract for a fixed period, regardless of the amount of electricity
consumed”, www.hydroquebec.com.
12 For more information on this issue, see Jean-Thomas BER-
NARD and Éric GENEST-LAPLANTE, “La régressivité de la
tarification de l’électricité selon le coût marginal”, Canadian
Public Policy – Analyse de Politiques, XXI:4:401-412, 1995.
13 Hydro-Québec bill (2001).
The way that Hydro-Québec sets prices, particularly in
the residential sector, does not encourage us to use less
electricity. It is regressive insofar as the fixed charge11 is
the same for all households, no matter how much they
use12. Yet the electricity rate structure suggests the
opposite, since the second block of power is more
expensive than the first. This was the rate structure in
200113:
• Fixed charge: 39.0 ¢/day
• Price for 30 first kWh of the day: 4.74 ¢/kWh
• Price of additional kWh: 5.97 ¢/kWh
A Hydro-Québec survey of 8,588 Québec households in
2002 helps us to better understand their electricity use in
the year 2001. Table 9 summarizes the survey, indicating
average annual electricity consumption per household,
as well as the average annual bill for electricity per
household, according to different income brackets. The
average price for a kWh according to income bracket was
added to the available Hydro-Québec data. For example,
a household with an income of $15,000 uses over
12,800 kWh a year at an average of 7.21 ¢/kWh, whereas
a household with an income of $90,000 uses over 20,700
at an average price of 6.87 ¢/kWh.
Table 9 also brings out several important points. The
share of income devoted to buying electricity decreases
with income while electricity consumption increases with
income. It is thus appropriate to state that those with more
wealth use more electricity and contribute actively to
wasting the resource. Finally, the average price of a kWh
decreases with consumption and thus income, since
those with more wealth consume more. It is thus very
tempting to overconsume electricity: the more the consu-
Household income












Less than10,000 291 Over 8.5 848 11,630 7.29
10,000 to 19,999 767 6.2 924 12,823 7.21
20,000 to 29,999 902 4.0 998 14,023 7.12
30,000 to 39,999 959 3.2 1,103 15,702 7.02
40,000 to 59,999 1,497 2.5 1,243 17,945 6.93
60,000 to 79,999 860 1.9 1,319 19,040 6.93
80,000 to 99,999 455 1.6 1,423 20,713 6.87
100,000 to 119,999 252 1.5 1,603 23,289 6.88
120,000 and up 283 Less than 1.5 1,757 26,061 6.74
Average income: 49,197 6,266 2.4 1,190 17,051 6.98
Refuse to answer 2,322 --- 1,204 17,249 6.98
Total 8,588 --- 1,194 17,104 6.98
Sources: Energy Board, Demand (2002) and authors’ calculations
Table 9



























History of average electric power selling price in Québec by sector
Graph 21
Sources: ministère des Ressources naturelles et de la Faune du Québec and Desjardins, Economic Studies31 The public finance challenge of Québec
mer uses, the cheaper it is per unit. This all goes to
support our previous conclusions. It is therefore fair to say
that the less fortunate subsidize electricity consumption
by the wealthy, since the latter use more electricity while,
on average, paying a lower unit price for it. Which is why
the current pricing is regressive.
As for the commercial and industrial sectors, we need to
analyze the rates according to power: small, medium and
large power. The rates for small and medium power are
also regressive (the price of the second block of power is
less than that of the first). Nothing very surprising in the
commercial and industrial sectors paying less per kWh
(the electricity they use is barely transformed before
being delivered to them). However, it is surprising to see
how regressive the pricing is for two of three types of
power.
3.2. Consumption adjusts in conjunction
with price increases
Let us now look at what would happen to electricity
consumption if Québecers paid the market price for their


















Québec - residential Québec - commercial Québec - industrial
U.S. - residential U.S. - commercial U.S. - industrial
Comparison of average electric power selling price in Québec
and the United States
Graph 22




Power (kWh) 40 500 1 000 2 500 5 000 50 000
Consumption (kWh) 1 000 10 000 100 000 400 000 1 170 000 3 060 000 30 600 000
Montréal 6,30 7,86 9,84 6,36 5,23 4,23 4,00
Charlottetown 12,24 12,84 13,77 10,86 10,44 6,59 6,59
Edmonton 8,68 8,63 7,93 7,48 7,06 6,35 5,27
Halifax 9,70 10,21 11,40 8,44 6,78 5,77 5,72
Moncton 9,57 10,16 10,90 8,60 8,26 5,39 5,14
Ottawa 9,50 9,42 9,71 8,15 8,06 7,96 7,59
Regina 9,27 7,95 10,11 7,05 5,57 5,02 4,33
St. John’s 8,63 9,37 8,83 6,44 5,90 5,47 4,15
Toronto 10,34 10,17 11,65 8,87 8,42 7,91 7,71
Vancouver 6,56 7,18 6,69 5,04 4,68 4,36 3,60
Winnipeg 5,89 5,73 6,77 4,44 3,69 3,23 2,90
Boston 15,96 17,45 19,70 14,32 12,53 11,62 11,61
Chicago 10,26 12,73 14,20 9,69 8,89 7,76 6,24
Detroit 12,29 13,00 12,89 9,01 7,61 6,60 6,09
Houston 10,95 10,01 11,21 8,21 5,91 5,58 4,97
Miami 11,21 10,53 11,93 9,20 7,78 7,24 7,23
Nashville 9,36 9,87 12,19 8,49 8,16 7,41 6,08
New York 19,07 19,40 21,58 16,09 13,55 12,59 12,59
Portland 8,73 8,87 8,78 6,34 5,56 5,27 4,84
San Francisco 19,56 19,21 25,86 21,39 16,28 15,93 15,90
Seattle 9,34 7,86 8,29 7,44 7,42 7,40 7,08
Average (Canada only) 8,79 9,05 9,78 7,43 6,74 5,66 5,18
Total average 10,64 10,88 12,11 9,14 7,99 7,13 6,65
Source: Hydro-Québec “Comparison of Electricity Prices in Major North American Cities”, (2004 and 2005)
Table 10
General
Medium power Large power
Average prices for electricity in major North American cities on April 1, 200432 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
14 The export price is a wholesale price which is different from
a generally higher retail price.
downward. Table  10 shows the average prices for
electricity in 2004 in several major North American cities
for the residential sector and for the different powers in
the industrial and commercial sectors. The average price
in Montréal for consumption of 1,000 kWh in the residential
sector is 6.30 ¢/kWh compared to 8.79 ¢/kWh on average
for Canadian cities and 10.64 ¢/kWh for all major North
American cities. In 2004, if the price of the electricity sold
in Québec had been set at the average price for major
North American cities for the same year, demand for
electricity would have dropped from about 165,887 mil-
lion kWh to 163,625 million. The approximately 2,000 mil-
lion kWh saved would have been exported at the average
export price14 for 2004, raising an amount of about $5.3B.
If low-income households received a larger QST refund
in compensation, this would have taken just over $250M
from the figure of $5.3B15. In the very short term, aligning
the price of electricity with the market price would thus
generate over $5.1B. Table 11 summarizes the detail of
the data and calculations used to reach this result.
The above example shows the degree to which aligning
our rates with market rates could reduce electricity
consumption by Québecers. The adjustment, unrealistic
in the short term, would, in practice, occur in the medium
term. Households would adapt to the price increases by
either decreasing their consumption through new life
habits, or by changing energy hungry appliances. Some
would even abandon electric heating to convert to a
heating oil or natural gas system that could be more
____________________
15 Some adjustment measures for the industrial and commercial
sectors could also be put in place.
Residential Commercial Industrial Other
Market price
1 (¢/kWh) 10,64 9,45 6,65 7,81
Short-term price elasticities
2 -0,05 -0,04 -0,01 -0,01
Average 2004 price (¢/kWh) 6,36 6,74 3,95 4,91
2004 sales (kWh) 58 002 000 000 33 137 000 000 69 722 000 000 5 026 000 000
2004 sales revenues ($) 3 688 927 200 2 233 433 800 2 754 019 000 246 776 600
Sales if price = market price (kWh) 56 559 868 247 32 696 214 303 69 366 071 131 5 003 134 834
Sales revenues ($) 6 017 969 981 3 089 792 252 4 612 843 730 390 744 831
Surplus sales revenues per sector ($) 2 329 042 781 856 358 452 1 858 824 730 143 968 231
Surplus total sales revenues ($B)
Difference in sales per sector (kWh) 1 442 131 753 440 785 697 355 928 869 22 865 166
Average export price in 2004 (¢/kWh) 7,53 7,53 7,53 7,53
Surplus export sales revenues per sector ($) 108 592 521 33 191 163 26 801 444 1 721 747
Total export surplus ($B)
Total surplus before compensation ($B)
Approximate number of low-income households 400 000
Approximate consumption with the price increase (kWh) 15 600
Total consumption with the price increase (kWh) 6 240 000 000
Average sales prior to the price increase ($) 407 040 000
Average sales after the price increase ($) 663 936 000
Difference to compensate for ($) 256 896 000
Total surplus (in $B)
1 Hydro-Québec “Comparison of Electricity Prices in Major North American Cities”, 2004.
2 Bernard Jean-Thomas, Un modèle intégré de la demande totale d’énergie. Application à la province de Québec, Green and Université Laval, 2000.
3 Institut de la statistique du Québec, Québec Handy Numbers, 2005 edition.
Sources: Hydro-Québec, 2004 annual report and authors’ calculations
Table 11





(13% of approximately 3,000,000 households
3)
(16,000 with -0.05 elasticity)
(average of $642.24 per household)33 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
16 Another way of sensitizing people to saving energy would be
to introduce a practice of peak load pricing using smart counters
(as is now the case for many Ontario households). This way,
households could choose the time of day when they want to use
more electricity, based on the price set for that period. The
amount of electricity consumed by all Québecers in peak
periods would decline, which might allow Hydro-Québec to stop
importing electricity during this period (primarily in wintertime).
For more details, see Maryse ROBERT, Impact de la tarification
de l’électricité au prix du marché sur le secteur résidentiel :
application à la province de Québec, economics research
report, Université de Montréal, December 2005.
advantageous. This would free up a larger quantity of
kWh to export. Those who can reduce consumption the
most are, of course, the wealthier households. Since they
waste the most, it is thus easier for them to reduce their
demand for electricity16. The industrial and commercial
sectors will follow the same path, regulating their electricity
consumption due to higher rates.
Hydro-Québec recently published the 2005 edition of its
document Comparison of Electricity Prices in Major North
American Cities. It contains a comparison similar to
table  10, but based on average prices in effect on
April 1, 2005. The average residential price to consume
1,000 kWh in Montreal is 7.33 ¢ compared to 11.78 ¢ on
average for major North American cities. Since the price
in effect in Montreal has gone up parallel to the average
price for major North American cities, our conclusions
remain basically unchanged. Moreover, on February 28,
the Régie de l’énergie ordered an average increase of
5.3% in Hydro-Québec’s rates, which will come into effect













































Montréal, QC = 100
Comparison of electricity prices in major North American cities –
residential customers (1,000 kWh per month*)
Sources: Hydro-Québec and Desjardins, Economic Studies
* Rates in effect on April 1, 2005.
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4. Concrete, socially acceptable solutions for the future
____________________
17 A number of Canadian provinces have such funds. The
Québec government has also resorted to constituting such
“reserves” in recent years.
In the previous chapters, we looked at a few avenues for
rectifying Québec’s fiscal situation, while noting,
unfortunately, that we do not have much leeway.
At this point, we would like to enlarge the debate, analyzing
the coherence of the policies for rectifying the fiscal
situation. We must not let one hand destroy what the
other has achieved. As many stakeholders will participate
in the discussion, and no one is ignorant of the problem’s
political dimension, widening the debate is essential.
Once again, we should make a distinction between the
short and long terms. Given that the issue of Québec’s
public finances is a serious one and that the debt is
substantial, the problem can only be resolved in the
medium and fairly long term. There are two important
points to be made here. First, it will take some time before
we see concrete results from recovery policies. They will
need continuous support. This is doubtless an onerous
task, but it is part of a social project. Second, in the
context of a long, tough turnaround, the concept of public
policy consistency over time takes on a major dimension.
Under the circumstances, how can we guarantee this
type of consistency in a democracy? The answer is
simple: the political stakeholders must, in one way or
another, be bound to maintaining the goal of reducing the
public debt.
4.1. Expansion of the Act respecting
the elimination of the deficit
and a balanced budget
One of the solutions is expanding the anti-deficit law
(1996 Act respecting the elimination of the deficit) to
include debt control. What is involved is the official
creation of a yearly contingency reserve. (An amount of
$500M seems reasonable in the short term. Within five
years, a billion dollars would be suitable, that is, 2% of the
State’s total budget.) The reserve would be used to
balance the budget in the event that economic activity
slows substantially (as occurred following the events of
September 11, 2001). The budgetary policy would thus
be to achieve a budget surplus, not simply balance the
public finances, except in the event of major shocks.
When the reserve is not needed to balance the State’s
budget, it should be allocated to retiring the debt and a
stabilization fund17. The stabilization fund would become
an additional reserve, helping reduce the risk of a budget
deficit in later years. The portion not used by the
stabilization fund would enable an increase in both
frequency and amount of repayment for a portion of the
debt, together with the debt retirement fund (see sec-
tion 4.2). The Act would have to set out the parameters for
contribution and disbursement associated with the yearly
contingency reserve and stabilization fund, so as to
maximize debt retirement.
We must stress the deficiencies of the current anti-deficit
law in an accounting context that separates capital
spending from operating expenses. The anti-deficit law
considers deficits over a five-year period rather than a
one-year period. This encourages the government to
incur a deficit to make ends meet for its operating
expenses, hoping to catch up later. The tendency toward
opting to fix the situation later risks becoming cyclical
both economically and politically. If economic growth
does not occur, it will not be possible to make up the
accumulated shortfall. A government at the end of its
mandate with a slim chance of being re-elected could
bequeath a sizeable problem to its successor. Lastly, if a
surplus is ever recorded in this new accounting framework,
it could very well be used for something besides retiring
the debt.
The expansion of the anti-deficit act will have to be
accompanied by measures likely to accelerate the
recovery, or at least not hinder it. We thus need credible,
prudent policies. Here are a few.
4.1.1. Not deviating from the rule of thumb
on only going into debt to invest
An optimal policy on public indebtedness that is compatible
with the “rule of thumb” could focus on a “structural” target
corresponding to the value of public investments financed
by debt, and follow a rule that would tolerate a deviation
from this target in the event of negative shocks. Note, in
passing, that such a policy is intrinsically compatible with
the intergenerational equity criterion.36 The public finance challenge of Québec
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18 CIRANO, Financement du budget de l’État. Où en sommes-
nous? Où allons-nous? December 3, 2004.
4.1.2. Freeze government spending
or at least its growth rate in real terms
(rate excluding inflation)
Given the current tax burden in Québec, it would be
difficult to increase it to finance further spending without
encouraging tax evasion and eventually decreasing the
tax inflows, which would result from the reduction in
taxpayers’ legal work hours.
4.1.3. Capital spending that increases the debt
must be incurred on the basis of its
economic cost-effectiveness
The government cannot throw itself into capital spending
programs without making full, precise calculations: it
most properly assess the investments’ economic cost-
effectiveness. This statement is particularly important
insofar as the cost of government projects often exceeds
projections. Political considerations cannot take
precedence over economic considerations without
substantial consequences, particularly if the government
has no financial leeway.
4.2. Creation of a debt retirement fund
In addition to an annual contingency reserve, the Québec
government should immediately create a fund to be used
solely for retiring the debt. With respect to the trend for the
debt in relation to the economy in the coming years and
decades, ideally, the government should establish a
quantitative target. Various revenues (for instance, the
yearly contingency reserve surplus not used by the
stabilization fund, and the economic rent freed up by a
further increase in electricity prices) could be paid into
this fund directly every year, then disbursed at the end of
each fiscal year to repay some of the debt contracted. The
revenues that go into this fund should also be covered by
the new anti-deficit and debt control act. In section 5 of
this study, we will see that, over a twenty-year period, an
annual rate increase of 2% in addition to the annual rate
increase ordered by the Régie de l’énergie, if applicable,
would generate a cumulative surplus of about $40B (in
this example, 13% of Québec’s low-income households
would receive financial compensation). This amount could
be transferred to the debt retirement fund every year (as
the new act would stipulate) and could thus be allocated
to repaying the accumulated debt. The amounts amassed
in this fund would be used to redeem Québec bonds on
the national and international markets.
After twenty years, this “virtual” debt retirement fund
would have seen contributions of about $40B, and could
then be advantageously compared to the Alberta Heritage
Savings Trust Fund (currently at $13B Canadian) and, all
else being equal, to Norway’s Government Petroleum
Fund (currently over $200B CAN). Moreover, payments
toward the accumulated debt would lead to major savings
in interest payments. In other words, with this simple
measure (and, naturally, thanks to the combined effect of
inflation and economic growth), the ratio of total debt to
GDP (the ministère des Finances du Québec refers to
this debt more) could go from 44% in 2005 to about 15%
in 2025, 5% below the current average ratio of Canadian
provinces with Québec excluded. Don’t forget that, in the
decades to come, the other provinces’ average ratio of
20% will also most likely decrease. They will also be
seeking to further clean up their finances in the years to
come.
4.3. Increase productivity and the economy’s
performance
We have seen that the magnitude of the problem means
that Québec’s policies must be coordinated to favour debt
reduction. Here, the Québec government has some taxa-
tion elements at its disposal. At a conference on financing
the Québec State’s budget18, participants were unanimous
about the need to reform Québec’s tax system by making
it more optimal for the economy. Specifically, this involves
taking the following steps:
• Reducing tax on corporate capital
• Less personal income tax and more
consumption tax
• Increasing rates for some goods and services
4.3.1. Reducing tax on corporate capital
For tax competition and mobility reasons, it is impossible
to tax corporate capital substantially. A non-competitive
tax would drive capital and productive investment away.
Less investment also means fewer jobs. If we were able
to tax business more heavily, individuals would also have
an additional burden to deal with: they would pay more for
their goods and services, and risk seeing their employment
conditions deteriorate. This tax is also a production
expense for the company which, to stay competitive,
must offset it somehow.37 The public finance challenge of Québec
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19 In constant dollars, annual tuition fees (for undergraduates)
have been kept below where they were in the 60s. For example,
the tuition charges in effect in 1965 amount to $3,100 in today’s
dollars.
4.3.2. Less personal income tax and more
consumption tax
Countries with high social expenditures (public financing
for healthcare and education, and income redistribution
measures) prefer consumption taxes to income taxes.
Income taxes help to reduce the labour supply, particularly
for those receiving social assistance, and low-income
and high-income earners. For these groups, the implicit
or explicit marginal tax rate does not encourage them to
hold a job or work more hours. A consumption tax does
not have this effect. Which is why, for Québec, the
question arises about the relevance of having European-
style social policies with American-style taxation. From
this perspective, reviewing Québec’s tax mix seems to be
necessary. Moreover, if the consumption tax (which is a
heavier burden on low-income earners) is applied to
goods and essential services, the tax’s regressiveness
could be reduced.
4.3.3. Increasing rates for some goods
and services
We must use fair pricing (pricing that reflects the marginal
cost) to finance some State services. The most eloquent
example here is that of electricity, where low rates encou-
rage overconsumption and waste. Water, tuition fees19,
and daycare costs also fall into this category. We must
avoid using pricing policies as a way to redistribute
income. These overly low prices primarily benefit those
who are better off. There are other ways to support people
with low incomes. Note that a number of economists see
Québec’s relative impoverishment (Québec has one of
the lowest incomes per capita in North America) as due
in part to this wasting of water and electricity resources.
For example, Alberta does not have this problem because
it has a better pricing system for its oil resources.
Lastly, in mentioning the need to increase prices instead
of taxing, we wish to differentiate between policies that
affect resource allocation and policies designed to
redistribute resources. The price system is not a good
way to redistribute resources. In addition to being socially
regressive, this type of policy encourages resource waste
while keeping prices artificially low. Which is why we need
to find another means than the price system for
redistributing wealth.
4.4. Respect for jurisdictions and the sharing
of the “fiscal imbalance”
It is clear that resolving the fiscal imbalance is not a
solution that will wipe out our public debt or, by waving a
magic wand, ensure that Québec’s fiscal situation will
turn around. The fiscal imbalance must not obscure
Québec’s accountability for the state of its own public
finances. True, the federal government has generated
major surpluses, a share of which was very fortunately
earmarked for retiring federal public debt (which was
quite substantial at the time). However, there seems to be
a desire to allocate these surpluses to new spending,
some of which is not very relevant economically, and
some of which involves areas that are under provincial
jurisdiction. This situation is clearly deplorable, since it
muddies the waters regarding the accountability of political
authorities and does not deliver any economic efficiency.
If there is a fiscal imbalance, the federal government is
responsible for it, and it hurts Québec and Canadian
taxpayers, who pay too much tax for federal services. The
surplus should therefore be returned to the taxpayers by
either continuing the federal government’s debt retirement
or by decreasing their federal taxes. It is up to the
provinces to decide to take back the surpluses from
taxpayers, if they decided it is necessary, rather than
simply transferring the surpluses to them automatically.
They will have to convince taxpayers of the merit of their
actions. In other words, the issue of the imbalance is not
just a matter of surplus money that involves one tier of
government rather than another. Over the years, it has
also been used as an excuse to avoid dealing with
Québec’s fiscal problems. Which is why there is now an
urgent need to solve the problem.39 The public finance challenge of Québec
5. Create a precise plan through electricity pricing
____________________
20 The comparative advantage that is often claimed for low
electricity rates must be compared with the benefits associated
with retiring the debt.
21 Note that this adjustment is not realistic in the short term, but
it still provides a good picture of the need to reduce electricity
consumption. In practice, the adjustment would occur in the
medium term.
22 According to Statistics Canada’s after-tax low income measure,
corresponds to 50% of the median after-tax income adjusted to
family size.
To free up the amounts needed to retire the debt by
increasing electricity prices, we must first align the current
price for electricity with the market price20. We have two
options for doing this: immediately raise rates to market
prices, as we discussed in section 3, or apply a uniform
yearly increase over a long period to all sectors.
5.1. First simulation: rates at market prices
For the very short-term scenario, not all sectors of Qué-
bec (residential, commercial, industrial and other) would
be subject to the same increase, given that the gap
between the current and market prices is different for
each sector. The industrial sector would be hit by the
largest increase (+68.4%), followed closely by the
residential sector (+67.3%). As a result of this rate increase,
the wealthier households would cut back on unnecessary
consumption. There would therefore be less waste. As a
result, the real increase in their electricity bill would be
smaller than the rate increase21. As low-income
households cannot cut consumption by as much as
wealthier households, the increase in their bill would be
offset by a larger QST refund.
For example, a low-income household22 that uses about
16,000 kWh per year would see its electric bill go up by
just over $642 (see table 11 on page 32). A larger QST
refund would compensate for this increase. Moreover,
Hydro-Québec has already started to promote energy
conservation by offering rebates to people who want to
replace their old thermostats with programmable electronic
thermostats that can be set according to the time and the
day of the week. This type of savings, combined with
better energy consumption habits, helps cut the electricity
bill.
Also, note that interest rates play a major role in the need
to align energy prices with market prices. In the event that
interest rates go up, it would be better for the government
to repay the debt more quickly. Interest on the debt would,
in fact, be higher.
5.2. Second simulation: price increases
of 2%, 5%, 10% and 20% a year
The need to align energy prices with market prices can be
tackled from another angle. The government could raise
rates by a specific percentage a year, and calculate the
number of years it would take for the various sectors to be
aligned with the market price (see table 13). Clearly, the
inflation rate must be combined with each yearly price
increase. For example, with an increase of 2% a year, it
would take 26 years for the average residential price to
match the average price in major North American cities.
The timeframe drops to almost ten years with a yearly
increase of 5%, and to just under three years with an
increase of 20% a year. We also calculated the number
of years it would take to match the average price on the
Canadian market in 2004. The results are displayed in
table 14. Since the average price in Canada is a little
lower than the average price in North America, fewer
years are required, but it would still take a long time.
Yearly rate of increase in tariffs for 
all sectors
2% 5% 10% 20%
Residential 26.0 10.5 5.4 2.8
Commercial 17.1 6.9 3.5 1.9
Industrial 26.3 10.7 5.5 2.9
Other 23.4 9.5 4.9 2.5
Sources: Hydro-Québec and authors’ calculations
Table 13
Number of years to reach the average price on the North 
American market in 2004, according to four scenarios
Yearly rate of increase in tariffs for 
all sectors
2% 5% 10% 20%
Residential 16.3 6.6 3.4 1.8
Commercial 6.9 2.8 1.4 0.7
Industrial 13.7 5.6 2.8 1.5
Other 12.2 4.9 2.5 1.3
Sources: Hydro-Québec and authors’ calculations
Table 14
Number of years to reach the average price on the Canadian 
market in 2004, according to four scenarios40 The public finance challenge of Québec
____________________
23 The calculated surplus corresponds to the net surplus after
compensation is given to low-income households. It includes
the surpluses in each of the four sectors.
Using the data on the average price for major North
American cities, it is possible to calculate the total annual
surplus generated by increasing electricity rates in each
scenario23, and the surplus per capita. This method
allows us to determine approximately how many years it
would take to achieve the current average total debt ratio
per capita in Canada and Ontario. First, note that these
ratios (see table 3 on page 16) are $22,265 per Québec
resident, $13,173 per Ontario resident, and $18,528 per
Canadian. Québec’s ratio is thus $9,092 more than
Ontario’s, and $3,737 more than the Canadian average.
Now we simply need to determine how many years it will
take for the cumulative surplus to reach $9,092 per capita
(to catch Ontario) or $3,737 per capita (to catch up with
the average ratio for Canada). Table 16 summarizes the
results. The calculations are shown on the following
pages. Our projections thus indicate that the cumulative
surplus generated by a 2% increase a year would allow us
to catch up with Ontario in 27 years, and catch up with the
Canadian average in 17 years. With annual increases of
10%, these intervals drop to 16 years and 8 years
respectively. In these calculations, we assumed that no
improvement in total debt ratio per capita would occur for
the rest of Canada in the next 20 years, which is not very
likely. Consequently, it could take even longer for Québec
to catch up with Ontario and the Canadian average.
5.3. Toward a better allocation of hydropower
resources
The above simulations show the role that aligning
residential, commercial and, in particular, industrial
Yearly rate of increase in tariffs for 
all sectors
2% 5% 10% 20%
Number of years to reach Ontario’s 
total debt ratio per capita
27 19 16 15
Number of years to reach the 
Canadian average for the total debt 
ratio per capita
17 11 8 7
Sources: Hydro-Québec and authors’ calculations
Table 15
Number of years required to reach the total debt ratio
per capita of Ontario and the Canadian average
electricity rates with market prices could play in reducing
Québec’s public debt. For the industrial sector, it is not as
appropriate to speak of wasting resources or
overutilization. In general, low rates are granted to industry
out of a desire to create jobs and generate economic
growth. This is an arguable strategy, but not in all cases
or at any price. For example, if some companies benefit
from the proximity of the dams, and thus from an
advantageous rate (which excludes the costs of energy
lost as it is carried along the power lines), they reduce
their energy costs, even at market prices.
By not charging the price that others can obtain elsewhere,
the government is renouncing an additional source of
revenue. What matters is knowing how the revenue
would be used. If it is used to reduce the debt, we are
guaranteed the yield that is associated with this additional
revenue. If it is used to finance investments that are even
more profitable, if applicable, the additional revenue
would be even more important. It is hard to go into this
question in depth in this fairly general document, but the
key points have been made: the recommended increase
in electricity prices must primarily be used to reduce the
debt or make investments that are highly cost-effective
economically.41 The public finance challenge of Québec
Yearly increase in electricity rates*
Ann. Cumul. Ann. Cumul. Ann. Cumul. Ann. Cumul.
Surplus Year 1 172,01 172 23 23 429,55 430 57 57
Surplus Year 2 347,20 519 46 69 878,93 1 308 117 174
Surplus Year 3 525,63 1 045 70 139 1 349,11 2 658 179 353
Surplus Year 4 707,35 1 752 94 232 1 841,09 4 499 244 597
Surplus Year 5 892,44 2 645 118 351 2 355,93 6 855 312 909
Surplus Year 6 1 080,96 3 726 143 494 2 894,76 9 749 384 1 293
Surplus Year 7 1 272,98 4 999 169 663 3 447,78 13 197 457 1 750
Surplus Year 8 1 468,55 6 467 195 858 3 884,66 17 082 515 2 265
Surplus Year 9 1 667,77 8 135 221 1 079 4 342,10 21 424 576 2 841
Surplus Year 10 1 870,68 10 006 248 1 327 4 807,72 26 232 637 3 478
Surplus Year 11 2 077,38 12 083 275 1 602 5 101,50 31 333 676 4 154
Surplus Year 12 2 287,92 14 371 303 1 905 5 101,50 36 435 676 4 831
Surplus Year 13 2 502,39 16 873 332 2 237 5 101,50 41 536 676 5 507
Surplus Year 14 2 720,87 19 594 361 2 598 5 101,50 46 638 676 6 183
Surplus Year 15 2 943,42 22 538 390 2 988 5 101,50 51 739 676 6 860
Surplus Year 16 3 170,14 25 708 420 3 408 5 101,50 56 841 676 7 536
Surplus Year 17 3 401,11 29 109 451 3 859 5 101,50 61 942 676 8 213
Surplus Year 18 3 579,22 32 688 475 4 334 5 101,50 67 044 676 8 889
Surplus Year 19 3 756,60 36 445 498 4 832 5 101,50 72 145 676 9 565
Surplus Year 20 3 937,31 40 382 522 5 354 5 101,50 77 247 676 10 242
Surplus Year 21 4 121,43 44 503 546 5 900 5 101,50 82 348 676 10 918
Surplus Year 22 4 309,02 48 812 571 6 472 5 101,50 87 450 676 11 594
Surplus Year 23 4 500,15 53 313 597 7 068 5 101,50 92 551 676 12 271
Surplus Year 24 4 690,52 58 003 622 7 690 5 101,50 97 653 676 12 947
Surplus Year 25 4 881,05 62 884 647 8 337 5 101,50 102 754 676 13 623
Surplus Year 26 5 101,51 67 986 676 9 014 5 101,50 107 856 676 14 300
Surplus Year 27 5 101,51 73 087 676 9 690 5 101,50 112 957 676 14 976
Number of years to reach 
Ontario’s total debt ratio per capita
Number of years to reach the 
Canadian average for the total 
debt ratio per capita
Sources: Hydro-Québec and authors’ calculations
* Inflation must of course be combined with the annual rate increase. The calculated surplus corresponds to the net surplus
* after compensation is given to low-income households.
Surplus/per capita ($)
11
Surplus $M Surplus/per capita ($)
27
17
   Difference total debt Québec and total debt Canadian average: 22,265 – 18,526 = 3,737
19
Table 16
Calculations for yearly surpluses according to four rate increase scenarios starting in 2004
2% 5%
   Québec’s population in 2004: 7,542,760
   Difference total debt Québec and total debt Ontario: 22,265 – 13,173 = 9,092
   Assumptions for the table: Constant interest rate
   Assumptions for the table: Zero inflation rate
   Assumptions for the table: Long-term elasticity excluded 
   Assumptions for the table: Constant population
   Assumptions for the table: No improvement in total debt ratio per capita in the rest of Canada
Surplus $M42 The public finance challenge of Québec
Yearly increase in electricity rates*
Ann. Cumul. Ann. Cumul. Ann. Cumul. Ann. Cumul.
Surplus Year 1 857,57 858 114 114 1 709,45 1 709 227 228
Surplus Year 2 1 794,36 2 652 238 352 3 652,22 5 362 484 712
Surplus Year 3 2 818,07 5 470 374 726 5 101,41 10 463 676 1 389
Surplus Year 4 3 801,81 9 272 504 1 230 5 101,41 15 564 676 2 065
Surplus Year 5 4 702,79 13 975 623 1 853 5 101,41 20 666 676 2 741
Surplus Year 6 5 101,46 19 076 676 2 530 5 101,41 25 767 676 3 418
Surplus Year 7 5 101,46 24 178 676 3 206 5 101,41 30 869 676 4 094
Surplus Year 8 5 101,46 29 279 676 3 882 5 101,41 35 970 676 4 770
Surplus Year 9 5 101,46 34 380 676 4 559 5 101,41 41 072 676 5 447
Surplus Year 10 5 101,46 39 482 676 5 235 5 101,41 46 173 676 6 123
Surplus Year 11 5 101,46 44 583 676 5 912 5 101,41 51 274 676 6 799
Surplus Year 12 5 101,46 49 685 676 6 588 5 101,41 56 376 676 7 476
Surplus Year 13 5 101,46 54 786 676 7 264 5 101,41 61 477 676 8 152
Surplus Year 14 5 101,46 59 888 676 7 941 5 101,41 66 579 676 8 828
Surplus Year 15 5 101,46 64 989 676 8 617 5 101,41 71 680 676 9 505
Surplus Year 16 5 101,46 70 091 676 9 293 5 101,41 76 781 676 10 181
Surplus Year 17 5 101,46 75 192 676 9 970 5 101,41 81 883 676 10 857
Surplus Year 18 5 101,46 80 294 676 10 646 5 101,41 86 984 676 11 534
Surplus Year 19 5 101,46 85 395 676 11 322 5 101,41 92 086 676 12 210
Surplus Year 20 5 101,46 90 497 676 11 999 5 101,41 97 187 676 12 886
Surplus Year 21 5 101,46 95 598 676 12 675 5 101,41 102 288 676 13 563
Surplus Year 22 5 101,46 100 699 676 13 351 5 101,41 107 390 676 14 239
Surplus Year 23 5 101,46 105 801 676 14 028 5 101,41 112 491 676 14 915
Surplus Year 24 5 101,46 110 902 676 14 704 5 101,41 117 593 676 15 592
Surplus Year 25 5 101,46 116 004 676 15 380 5 101,41 122 694 676 16 268
Surplus Year 26 5 101,46 121 105 676 16 057 5 101,41 127 796 676 16 944
Surplus Year 27 5 101,46 126 207 676 16 733 5 101,41 132 897 676 17 621
Number of years to reach 
Ontario’s total debt ratio per capita
Number of years to reach the 
Canadian average for the total 
debt ratio per capita
Sources: Hydro-Québec and authors’ calculations
   Difference total debt Québec and total debt Canadian average: 22,265 – 18,526 = 3,737
Table 16 (continuation)
Calculations for yearly surpluses according to four rate increase scenarios starting in 2004
   Assumptions for the table: Constant interest rate
   Assumptions for the table: Zero inflation rate
   Assumptions for the table: Long-term elasticity excluded 
   Assumptions for the table: Constant population
   Assumptions for the table: No improvement in total debt ratio per capita in the rest of Canada
10% 20%
Surplus/per capita ($) Surplus/per capita ($) Surplus $M
   Québec’s population in 2004: 7,542,760






* Inflation must of course be combined with the annual rate increase. The calculated surplus corresponds to the net surplus
* after compensation is given to low-income households.43 The public finance challenge of Québec
CONCLUSION
F
iscally, Québec is facing a critical situation. A broad consensus exists on this matter among
experts and those who have had the opportunity to take a close look at the data. Unfortunately,
the documents tabled at the 2004 Forum des générations left no room for doubt on this matter.
Québec has one of the highest levels of public debt in Canada (Québec’s debt per capita is close
to twice that of Ontario’s). Debt service alone costs about $7.5B a year, equivalent to the budget
for almost 16 government departments. This amount would soar quickly in the event of interest rate
increases. Québecers are the most taxed people in North America, but a minority of taxpayers
supports the public sector (14% of taxpayers pay 60% of the income tax). In a context of economic
globalization, both capital and qualified workers are mobile: the government therefore has very little
or even no leeway to levy further taxes.
Since the aging of the population could slow economic growth and worker participation in the labour
market while putting huge pressure on public health spending, we must act quickly.
The solution is within reach: use our hydropower resources. What is involved is gradually raising
electricity rates to bring them more into line with market prices. There are two advantages to this
measure from the perspective of sustainable development: we can repay the public debt and save
energy by encouraging better allocation of hydropower resources. This solution, like the other
solutions we have reviewed, maximizes the effectiveness of our personal and collective decisions.
Striving to achieve greater efficiency will, in fact, help reduce the cost of retiring the debt.
Decisions are urgently needed so that Québec can maintain its competitive strength, retain all that
it has acquired in social terms, and ensure intergenerational equity. By raising electricity rates and
adjusting pricing for some services, the government would replace socially regressive policies with
progressive, economically efficient policies.
Our proposed debt reduction solution must be part of a long-term, global strategy for cleaning up
public finances. As we have seen, this is a huge job. To achieve it, we will need a policy that remains
consistent in the face of the inevitable changes in the political and economic climates. This can only
be achieved with a broad consensus in the context of an act governing the principle of debt
retirement (extending the anti-deficit act to debt control). As with all true social projects, the
challenge is a large one, but we must keep the following in mind: ignoring the problem or postponing
a solution to later could, as the years and decades unfold, jeopardize both our social programs and
the place of a modern Québec in the North American economy.45 The public finance challenge of Québec
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